Penality in Scandinavia has been seen as somewhat of an outlier, a redoubt against the punitive turn witnessed in other parts of Western Europe and the United States. This article examines contemporary discourses of penality in Norway following the entry into government of the populist-right Progress Party. The analysis describes how government representatives frame themselves as protecting individual security and prioritising victims whilst pursuing a bordered version of penal populism directed against non-citizens. These non-Norwegians are shown to be the focus of a range of penal populist policies, including fast-track justice, a warehousing prison regime, targeting of petty offenders and the double punishment of imprisonment and deportation. In a context where the penal welfare consensus with respect to Norwegian citizens remains relatively strong, it is easier for the Progress Party to 'do populism' by focusing on non-citizens.
The status of penal exceptionalism in Scandinavia has been under scrutiny for some time. What began with Pratt's (2008a) seminal article (see also Green, 2008) has given way to debate over the nature and trajectory of Scandinavian exceptionalism (Pratt, 2008b; Ugelvik and Dullum, 2012; Nilsson, 2013; Shammas, 2014; Pratt and McLean, 2015; . This article focuses on Norway, where in 2013 a left-of-centre government was replaced by a minority coalition of the centre-right Conservative Party and the populist-right Progress Party, with the Progress Party taking charge of the Ministry of Justice and Public Security. This article seeks to examine how government and media voices frame issues of punishment, prisons policy and offending. The main question to be addressed is whether there has been a discursive upsurge in penal populism? Or, conversely, does Norway retain a sufficiently resilient penal welfare consensus that leaves little room for such populism?
The article first summarises key features of the punitive turn and the debates around Scandinavian exceptionalism and the Norwegian penal welfare model. It then assesses how governing voices in Norway represent themselves as dynamic, prioritising victims, keen to quickly increase prison capacity, focused on individual security and as actively deporting foreign criminals. The analysis then shows how foreign criminals are framed as unwanted, in need of deportation, requiring swift justice, deserving of a lesser prison regime and as not requiring rehabilitation. The article interprets the relative silence regarding the mission of the criminal care system when it comes to Norwegian citizens as a passive erosion of penal exceptionalism, and that the bordered penal populism that permeates the discourse risks negative implications for the criminal care system as a whole and for the position of non-citizens within Norwegian society. In conclusion, a broader theoretical point is made about moving away from a Westphalian notion of unitary national sovereignty to Bartelson's (1995) concept of a frame that may be drawn and re-drawn in a range of contexts, including within the penal system.
The punitive turn versus exceptionalism in Norway
The punitive turn has been well documented in this journal and elsewhere. But it is worth revisiting some of the milestone texts in order to set out the values and policies that we could expect from a justice minister of the populist right Progress Party in
Norway.
1 This is not to say that it will be possible to observe all of the developments set out below, but rather what we might expect from the extant literature on penal populism. David Garland sets out the following penal populist trends in this journal's inaugural editorial as follows:
The erosion of correctionalist ideologies; the turn to expressive justice and punitive measures; the return of the victim; the stress upon public protection and the management of risk; the changing objectives of community corrections and custodial institutions; the politicization of penal policy discourse; the commercialization of penality; the drift towards mass imprisonment (Garland, 1999: 7; see also 1996; .
John Pratt (2007) has usefully described penal populism as being nourished by division and dissent (p.12-13) and as being accelerated by processes of globalisation (p. 37 and
55-8). Pratt also notes the importance of globalisation Loïc Wacquant meanwhile has
written extensively on penality and neoliberalism, arguing that denunciations of 'urban violence', targeting of petty drug offenders, the deregulation and privatization of the criminal justice system, 'prison works' and 'zero tolerance' policies have all diffused across the Atlantic from the United States into Europe, often via the UK (Wacquant, 1999) , and that the penal system is increasingly used to manage the social insecurity that is a by-product of neoliberalism (ibid, 2001; 2009) . Dario Melossi's work would lead us to anticipate a change in representation of the criminal, from sympathetic to antipathetic, and to observe an affinity between the devaluation of the criminal and a rise in prison numbers (Melossi, 2000) . Feeley and Simon (1992) describe the emergence of discourses based on risk management and the aggregating of groups of 'dangerous offenders', whilst Jock Young (1999) details the transition from "a society whose accent was on assimilation and incorporation to one that separates and excludes" (p. 10). The extent to which the narrative of the Norwegian government embraces these trends is a key focus of this analysis.
Penality in Scandinavia has been described as exceptional in terms of its incarceration rates and humane prison conditions (Pratt, 2008a higher 'flows' through the system than many other European countries (Smith and Ugelvik, 2017: 22) .
The aim of this article is to supplement these findings by shedding new light on the discourses that are shaping contemporary Norwegian penality. One of the most salient and disturbing features of Norwegian penality is its increasingly bordered nature (Aas, 2014; Ugelvik, 2012b; Ugelvik and Ugelvik, 2013; Pakes and Holt, 2017a) . As such, this article highlights important recent developments that are the result of the Norwegian Progress Party's bordered penal populism.
Methodology
Government voices make proposals and calls for action on the basis of identity constructions -both of themselves and of those subject to the justice system. These identity constructions not only have consequences in shaping society's views of government, the penal system and offender, but are also linked to tangible policy proposals that define the scope of punishment and how it is implemented. Penal policies are based on representations of identity, but these identities are also produced and reproduced through penal policy (see Hansen 2006 and Campbell 1998 for related arguments on foreign policy). The analysis below sets out how the Norwegian governing discourse represents itself and those subject to the justice system. There is of course the question is this just talk? Is this rhetoric just intended to play to the party faithful whilst in practice maintaining the status quo? Whilst discussing intentionality when conducting discourse analysis is a tricky endeavour, the most recent general election results show that the Progress Party's rhetoric has enabled them to improve their electoral performance whilst also enacting tangible change in penal policy and practice.
Empirical data analysed include all press releases and op-eds produced by the Ministry These sources were first parsed with respect to who was being discussed -in addition to the governing self, which types of offender were identified in the discourse? Having identified the main narratives of the governing self and a foreign criminal other, the texts were coded openly-though with key aspects of penal populism in mind-for how self and other were represented. Having identified major representations for both the governing self and foreign criminal narratives, a more focused analysis of the empirical data was carried out in order to develop and deepen these representations and check for any conflicting examples.
Analysis: discourses of penality in Norway
The most striking aspects of the governing discourse are first, its relatively minimal discussion of the general prison population and second, the focus on non-citizens.
Whilst issues like rehabilitation, mental health and drug addiction are mentioned by government voices and reference is made at points to inmates and offenders, it is difficult to carve out any clear and coherent offender-narrative. It is interesting that the new government did not take the opportunity to set out its broad policy position on criminal justice issues, particularly given the Conservative Party had been in opposition for eight years and the Progress Party had never been in government before. Although there are elements of penal populism to be observed in the discourse, these are relatively 
The governing self narrative
The governing self describes itself as capacity-building and queue-reducing, dynamic and effective, prioritising victims, deporting and transferring non-citizens, and safeguarding the individual. These representations are summarised in Figure 1 below, which is based on Hansen's (2006: 46; 2007: 11) graphic technique:
Overall, the governing voices are keen to present themselves as safeguarding the individual. The Justice Minister released in 2015 a much-discussed film entitled Security in everyday life aimed at highlighting his achievements whilst in office. In announcing the film Anders Anundsen asserts the government has "implemented a range of initiatives to ensure that citizens have a safer everyday life" (Justis-Og Beredskapsdepartementet, 2015e). In a speech to Stortinget, Anundsen similarly asserts that "The government will deliver politics that takes care of the individual's need for safety and the rule of law" (Stortingsforhandlinger, 2014d (Stortingsforhandlinger, : 1416 (Stortingsforhandlinger, -1417 . This representation of the government as safeguarding the individual is also made by Conservative representatives, who note that "The safety of citizens has the highest priority" (Stortingsforhandlinger, 2013: 481) , and that their party "builds its justice In Oslo we have pointed out that we feel it is safer to live in New York. We have had a wave of robberies, a wave of rapes and we have had few police on the streets. … The new government prioritises the most important things first, namely strong police power.
Safer everyday life is an overarching goal for the new government, and this makes those of us in Oslo very happy. (Stortingsforhandlinger, 2013: 492) In this quotation we can see a contrast being made between the new government, framed as prioritising citizen safety and 'strong police power', and the past when Oslo was witness to waves of robberies and rapes. The contrast with New York is noteworthy given its invocation justifying broken windows and zero tolerance policies (Wacquant, 1999) . This representation of individual security also carries with it neoliberal meta-narratives and their privileging of the individual over society.
A Conservative representative gives two versions of a story featuring a young potential offender to illustrate his view that police deterrence is important when it comes to the safety of individuals:
A young man needs money quickly. He sees a lady standing at an ATM. The plan is to grab her bag and run. He walks with determined steps towards the lady. He sees no police. Knowing that the police are not around -they might be 15 minutes or half an hour away -he chooses to turn to the lady, grab the bag and run. The mugging victim's sense of security may be lost forever. The tax bill for society begins to mount up quickly: tens of thousands of kroner for the police investigation, tens of thousands of kroner for custody, hundreds of thousands of kroner for defence lawyers, prosecutors and the courts, hundreds of thousands of kroner to imprisonment and aftercare, tragedy for the victim, the family and close relations -and for the perpetrator. A crime which is committed means lost opportunities for the individual, lost opportunities for society and not least many, many millions that could be used for completely different purposes. Now let's change the story a little. Just before the young man is about to rob the lady, he sees the police a few hundred metres down the street. They are implementing situational prevention in this area. He gives up the robbery attempt and disappears. This incident cost society zero kroner, and the lady gets to keep both her handbag and her sense of security.
… Our goal, whether we are in opposition or government, must be to help the police do this even more and even better. 100 million kroner extra to the police is an important step on the road. A police service with fewer targets, fewer detailed directives, but more independence and freedom with responsibility, will be another. (Stortingsforhandlinger, 2013: 491-492) Here we can see how safeguarding of a potential victim-fulfilling Christie's (1986) attributes of the ideal victim-is emphasised via preventative deterrence (though the story can also be read as one of dispersal in action). This enables the representative to claim credit for increased spending on the police but also make a familiar right-ofcentre critique of overly detailed management and insufficient 'freedom'. The rhetoric employed here is emotive, with talk of a tragedy for the victim and perpetrator and the prospect of the victim's sense of security being lost forever. Norway has struggled with for years" (Justis-Og Beredskapsdepartementet, 2015c) Overall, the Justice Minister argues that increased capacity is a key priority for the government (Justis-Og Beredskapsdepartementet, 2016a), and that "In order to secure enough places for the future, we must build prisons with closed capacity. That we do not have them in place is a threat to the rule of law" (Justis-Og Beredskapsdepartementet, 2014c) Here, more emotive rhetoric is being employed, with a lack of capacity being framed as a threat to the rule of law. It is worth observing that the Justice Minister and his colleagues argue for the building of closed places, not open places or the extension of a programme of serving sentences under electronic monitoring at home. Increased capacity is also described as benefitting those sentenced to prison because it enables more focus on rehabilitation (Stortingsforhandlinger, 2015a: 3770) . This focus on increasing prison capacity comes at a time when reported crime is at its lowest point over a 24-year recording period (Statistics Norway, 2017) . Prioritising victims. This self-representation is hardly unusual: the rise in prominence of victims in crime policy debates has seen politicians from left and right present themselves as safeguarding the needs and rights of victims (Garland, 2000: 351-352; Walklate, 2016: 12 inter alia). Anders Anundsen is no different: "The government is extremely focused on better safeguarding of victims of crime" (Stortingsforhandlinger, 2014c: 812) . A party colleague goes further, arguing that whilst rehabilitation is important, "ethically it is even more important to take care of the victims" (Stortingsforhandlinger, 2014b: 3243) . He makes this statement in a debate on removing the statute of limitations for a number of serious offences, and later makes the following emotive contribution:
We as a society need to admit that time does not always heal all wounds. Some crimes are so brutal, so fundamentally inhumane, that we as a society should not allow punishment to fall away because of procedural rules. The victim of violence who has lost their confidence, the grieving and lonely widow with no answers, the mother of an abused child: these are people who have gone through the worst. … These victims and their families deserve answers, they deserve respect and they deserve not least to be taken seriously. (ibid)
Not only can we trace characteristics of Christie's (1986) ideal victim here, we can also see them set in opposition to "brutal" and "fundamentally inhumane" crimes. It is worth noting the crime rather than the criminal is framed as inhumane and brutal. Even so, it is clear that governing voices present themselves as prioritising victims, including explicitly prioritising their needs over those of offenders. In terms of practice, the Norwegian trial process gives a formal role to counsel for the injured party, whose role This prioritization of victims is also linked to specific policy proposals. For example:
when I see a proposal to once again start releasing people before their sentence is fully served, we [the Progress Party] believe that this is a bad solution first and foremost because it tramples on victims." (Stortingsforhandlinger, 2015a: 3787) When discussing extending a pilot project of serving prison sentences at home under electronic monitoring, victims are again brought to the fore: "A possible expansion must not be at the expense of consideration for the victims, their families and the common sense of justice" (Justis-Og Beredskapsdepartementet, 2016b). The transfer of prisoners to the Netherlands is justified via reference to victims getting to see sentences being served (Stortingsforhandlinger, 2015c: 607) . These quotes show how victim-talk carries both an expressive function in the framing of the governing self, but also an instrumental function as a tool for evaluating policy (Garland, 2000: 350) .
Dynamic and effective. This claim of being effective, dynamic and implementation-
focused is in the main about differentiating the governing parties from their predecessors. As one Conservative representative argues:
The voters wanted a new politics for the country and a new government. We now have that. Indeed, our justice policy will be marked by the fact that we have a new, more active and implementation-focused government (Stortingsforhandlinger, 2013 : Innst. 6 S (2013 , p. 481).
A Progress Party representative asserts similarly: "We now have a new and dynamic government that is prioritising safety on the streets." (Stortingsforhandlinger, 2013 : Innst. 6 S (2014 , s. 1373), while the Justice Minister states "We have halved the prison-queue … This is dynamism." (Stortingsforhandlinger, 2014a: 3103) . That a government seeks to present itself as dynamic and effective is hardly surprising.
Neither is the linking of these self-representations to claimed achievements (e.g. 
The foreign criminal narrative
Foreign criminals are, with one exception 2 , the only group to receive the label 'criminal' in the governing discourse. Norwegian citizens are generally described as offenders In terms of the media, Aftenposten, in a leading article critical of the transfer of prisoners to the Netherlands (entitled Prisoners are no commodity), notes also "especially in the east of the country, foreign citizens fill the prisons. They will be sent out of the country after serving their sentences." (Aftenposten, 2014) It is interesting to note that in an article that attacks the Justice Minister for "selling prisoners as exports", the deportation of foreign prisoners does not receive the same level of critical attention.
The framing of foreign criminals as requiring deportation extends also to those held unfit to stand trial, with the Justice Minister announcing his intention to simplify the expulsion process for this group (Justis-Og Beredskapsdepartementet, 2014b). The demarcation here of a radical, foreign other is clear: non-Norwegians who commit crime on Norwegian soil are to be sent out of the country as soon as possible. This is penality both bordered and populist, in that non-citizens are subject to the double punishment of imprisonment and deportation and the government seeks to reap political capital for this double punishment.
Requiring swift justice. This sense of urgency is borne out by the Justice Minister's proposal of a fast-track pilot project whereby criminal cases with "uncomplicated evidence" can be processed within a few days while suspects are in police custody (Justis-Og Beredskapsdepartementet, 2015d) . The project's aim is to "ensure a rapid connection between offense and judgment in cases where criminals today evade prosecution" (ibid), with the target groups including "visiting criminals" and those who have violated their conditions of entry. Anundsen states that "I do not want Norway to be a refuge for any form of criminality, and the use of such a fast-track is one initiative that can contribute to preventing this." (ibid). This gets some support in the media, with an editorial in Aftenposten asserting that "in cases where the offense is non-serious enough to be dealt with quickly yet serious enough that the district court may impose remand for 28 days, a fast track could lead to eviction a few weeks after arrest. This would be an improvement, especially in the most serious cases." (Aftenposten, 2015) The Justice Minister makes the Panglossian claim that this project has the potential to strengthen criminals' security under the law, on the basis that a swift conviction gives a stronger burden of proof for continued imprisonment than a remand hearing (Justis-Og Beredskapsdepartementet, 2015d).
In a further blurring of the lines between immigration control and the criminal justice system, the Justice Ministry also notes that asylum seekers subject to a separate fasttrack procedure may considered for police arrest and imprisonment whilst their cases are processed (Justis-Og Beredskapsdepartementet, 2015b) The Justice Minister argues that "The measure will make it harder to abuse the asylum system, not least for the minority who have intentions of criminal activity." (ibid) Røren and Todd (2014) There is no reason that the scarce resources of the criminal care system be used to provide the same services to foreign prisoners who will be sent out of the country when their sentences are complete, or who will be transferred to serve their sentence in their
homeland. There is a difference between our ambitions for inmates who will return to Norwegian society, and for foreigners who have committed a crime and will be deported. Foreign criminals must be deported immediately on completion of their sentence. Measures to facilitate release into Norwegian society after prison are not relevant for these inmates who will in any case be deported. (Solberg, 2013) The privileging of Norwegian citizens over non-Norwegians is once again made crystal clear. Solberg goes on to describe her concerns that "Foreign citizens on remand or serving a sentence in Norwegian prisons can develop contacts with established Norwegian criminal groups. They learn the language and get a foothold in this country. This is not desirable." (ibid) Given that 'learning the language' is seen as a key goal for integration of immigrants, there is a certain irony in this being framed as undesirable:
not least when considering that this undesirability is extended to those on remand who
have not been convicted of a crime. This point is underlined by the fact that over half of those on remand in Norwegian prisons are foreign citizens (57% of remand prisoners are foreign versus 23% of sentenced prisoners (Statistics Norway, 2016)).
Rehabilitation unnecessary. As Erna Solberg's blog sets out, governing voices represent the goal of rehabilitation as unnecessary and irrelevant for non-Norwegians, since they will be deported upon finishing their prison sentence. One of her party colleagues makes the same point:
In fact a third of inmates in Norwegian prisons are foreigners, people who do not have Norwegian citizenship. They are not entitled to the same rehabilitation and release programs that Norwegian inmates receive. Many of them who are going to serve their sentence in the Netherlands will not return to Norway and are not entitled to the same prison programs that Norwegian inmates receive, including further education. (Stortingsforhandlinger, 2015a: 3786) The citations in the previous section are also relevant here, given that the "completely different service provision" described by the Justice Minister (Stortingsforhandlinger, 2014c: 812) carries with it an implication that the availability of education, training and healthcare will be inferior for inmates in Kongsvinger prison. This is an expression of Andersen and Bjørklund's (1990) welfare chauvinism, whereby immigrants are framed as inappropriate recipients of the social goods provided by the state. So although there is limited desire expressed to make prison conditions worse for Norwegian citizens, this is not the case for non-citizens. Whilst to international visitors with a background in policy or academia, Norway presents itself as a humanitarian and rehabilitatory superpower, the discourse analysed here demonstrates that a different face is presented to visitors who fall foul of the justice system (Barker, 2012 : makes this point regarding Sweden). Charity clearly begins at home in the Norwegian penal context.
Concluding discussion
There are some clear aspects of a penal populist approach that can be found amongst One interpretation of the relative lack of penal populism (though increasing prison capacity and prison sentences, and a focus on victims and individual security are to be observed) regarding Norwegian citizens is that the receiving context (Garland, 2000: 354) of Norwegian society is such that a dramatic populist shift would have been too difficult and controversial for the Progress Party. It has been more straightforward for the party to 'do populism' by focusing on non-citizens. This group receive a full gamut of bordered penal populism, including fast-track justice, greater police resources, the call for a warehousing prison regime, targeting of petty offenders and the double punishment of imprisonment and deportation. As such this development chimes with Pratt and Miao's (2017: 75) observation that "crime concerns have become conflated with concerns about 'difference' and 'otherness'-of which being a stranger, a foreigner, or an immigrant, legal or otherwise, have become one of the most potent symbols."
The implications of this bordered penal populism are clearly severe for non-citizens who fall foul of the law. There were 899 deportations of convicted offenders in 2016
and 996 in 2015 (Utlendingsdirektoratet, n.d.) and legislation is being changed to widen the net over who can be deported (Justis-Og Beredskapsdepartementet, 2017) . This more exclusionary direction of travel is likely to continue given that the Progress Party are set to continue in government for another four years from September 2017. I would posit also that this bordered penal populism has potential implications for the criminal care system more broadly and indeed for the position of non-citizens in Norwegian society. Regarding the criminal care system, the distancing and othering of "foreign criminals" at the political level has already affected practice with this group (including a lesser prison regime and deportations), but it is also possible that practices of distancing 'bleed across' into how penality is experienced by Norwegian inmates as wellparticularly if they are of ethnic minority background. In terms of how these discourses of deportation and exclusion might affect migrants to Norway more generally, the exclusionary rhetoric and Damoclean sword of deportation that hangs over them are unlikely to assist integration.
There is also a broader theoretical point to be made on the conceptualisation of sovereignty. Aas highlights the problems of viewing penal culture as a "unitary national phenomenon" (2014: 534) bound up in the Westphalian concept of territorial sovereignty. The analysis presented here underlines this point. It might therefore be helpful to employ instead Jens Bartelson's (1995) conceptualisation of sovereignty as a parergon, or frame. This conceptualisation focuses on how the line between inside and outside, domestic and international, is drawn and redrawn without reifying this line.
Viewing sovereignty in this way should help us analyse how borders-the frame-are drawn in a range of contexts (including within the penal system), not just at the territorial boundaries of the state. As Neumann puts it, we are then able to analyse "how social boundaries between human collectives are maintained " (1999: 36) . This will thereby enable us to understand the implications of bordered penal populism for citizens, migrants and penality-and indeed sovereignty itself-in a context of increasing insularity in the face of globalisation.
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Notes
3 The Norwegian state employs three terms in this area: 'utvisning', which they translate as expulsion and which comes with a prohibition against re-entry of at least one year; 'bortvisning', which is translated as rejection of entry and means either being refused entry into Norway or being notified that one must leave Norway; and 'uttransportering', which is translated as deportation and means being escorted out of
Norway by the police.
